Econometrics received its big boost from applications to macroeconomic problems. Today, many economists have become wary of the use of advanced econometric methods in the construction of big macroeconomic models. At the same time, the increased availability of large micro data sets has opened up a vast field where econometric techniques can be applied more appropriately.
Micro data have their own peculiarities which have spawned many new research directions in econometrics such as "latent variables", "limited dependent variables" and "the analysis of panel data".
A distinctive feature of empirical microeconomic models is the much closer connection between economic theory, econometric method and empirical implementation than in the big macro models. Economic theory is often formulated in terms of individual decision making units like households, and having data on the individual units makes it possible to use the theory more fruitfully and to test it more severely. This closer connection between theory and data also more narrowly defines the appropriate econometric methods to be used.
One of the areas where economic theory and econometric methodology have cooperated most closely is that of household labor supply. Where Dutch economists were in the forefront of their profession when econometrics was applíed to macroeconomics, it is perhaps only natural that now they are lagging somewhat when applying econometrics to microeconomics.
In the area of household labor supply, with which this paper is concerned, there are only a few Dutch papers that use micro data to analyse household labor supply, and almost all of them are written by one person, J.
Siegers of the University of Utrecht. His research concentrates on female labor force participation and its relation with fertility. For the purpose of this paper his two papers on the joint labor supply of married couples are relevant, both co-authored by P.S.A. Renaud.
In Renaud and Siegers (1983a) a rather large Dutch dataset is used to model both the participation and the number of hours worked by the male and female partner in a family.l) The participation equations are estimated by 1) The dataset used is known as . The analysis covers 3114 households. The same dataset was also used by Hartog and Theeuwes (1983) . means of probit analysis. The hours equations are estimated by Tobit analysís.
11 equations are linear and estimated separately. Explanatory variables are male and female wage rates, age, and a number of dummies to represent family composition.
In Renaud and Siegers (1983b) the same dataset is used to estimate a variant of a model proposed by Leuthold (1978) . Now only hours equa[ions are estimated by Tobit analysis for female hours and by regression for male hours.
The soecifícations are again linear and the explanatory variables are almost the same as in the previous article with one exception. The partner's wage rate has been replaced by the partner's labor income.
However valuable these studies may be, they are subject to a number of limitations. First of all, the linear specifications used are quite restrictive, implying for instance that labor supply functions are either everywhere forward bending or everywhere backward bending. Secondly, the model used in Renaud and Siegers (1983a) is not derived from a well-developed theory of household behavior. Neoclassícal theory would imply restrictions on the parame~ers in the participation and hours equations, for example, bu[ such restrictions are neither imposed nor tested. The Leuthold model underlying the analysis is Renaud and Siegers (1983b) implies a simultaneity between the labor incomes of husband and wife, but in the estimation this simultaneity is not taken into account so that the parameter estimates are probably inconsistent.
In this paper we start from the neoclassical theory of labor supply, which takes the household as a homoQeneous decision makin.g unit.~lthough this mav seem a stronQ assumption to some, our empirical analysis shows that [he restrictions implied by the neoclassical theory hold up rather well. As an empirical specification we adopt the Almost Ideal Demand System (~,IDS) proposed bv Deaton and`~uellbauer (1980a Deaton and`~uellbauer ( , 1980b . This system is derived from neoclassical theory and it is quite flexible. Labor supply functions can be forward bendino in a certain range of wages and backward bending ín a different ran~e. We estimate female and male labor supply as one system, thereby attaining maximal efficiency of the estimates.
One important assumption in the neoclassical model is that the household decision is subject to no other restriction than a budget constraint and a time constraint. So institutional restrictions are ignored. In our data we have not only information on how many hours each partner works per w~ek, but also how manv hours they would líke to work. It ís the extra avail.abí?.ity of 3 this latter variable which allows us to i nvestigate the biasing effects of institutional constraint.
Once we have estimated the model and have found that the neoclassical framework fits the data rather well we go on to i llustrate the value of a model rooted firmly in theory for the analysis of policy issues. We briefly investigate the measurement of the cost of children and the effects of a rationing of male labor supply, proposed by many people in The~letherlands as a means of reducing unemployment, on female labor supply.
AlthouQh we admit to be rather pleased by the empirical results obtaíned, we should stress that this paper is primarily an investigation into the potential of the AIDS as a model for household labor supply. Before the results can really be used in policy with a fair degree of confidence, quite a few extra steps have to be taken. In the concludinn section we outline a number of these steps.
In order not to burden the presentation with a number of technicalities from neoclassical demand theory or from econometrics, most mathematical details have been relegated to three appendices.
2. The Model
We only consider householdsl) with both a male and a female partner present. Each household is supposed to behave as if it maxímizes a well-behaved utility function U(Qm, Rf, y), where Rm is male leisure, kf is female leisure and y is total household consumption. Maximization of the household utility function takes place subject to a full income constraint:
where wm and wf are the male and female wage rate respectively, T is the total number of hours available per time period and u is unearned family income2) (e.g. property income or welfare benefits); Y is full income.
Maximization of the utility function subject to (2.1) yields demand for leisure functions and a demand for consumption function. The mathematical form of these functions depends on the specification of the utility function.
Since economic theory is unspecific about the funtional form of demand functions (or utility functions, for that matter), it is advisable to choose a flexible specification, so that the data help to specify the functional form of the demand equations. One particularly convenient specification of the flexible functional form variety is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1980b 2) The wage rates an3~irearned income are all measured after taxes. with N the number of persons in a family.~~1 2ã -a0 f m log wm f af log w f f ay log p f 2 Ymm log wm (2.5) (2.6)~~~1
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Ymf log wm log wf~-Ym log wm log p} 2 Yff log wf (2.7) y Since, according to (2.1), sf f sm f sy -1, this equation will not provide any new information. Hence it is omitted.
The effect of family size on labor supply has been modelled here as a quasi-price effect along the lines set out in Barten (1964) . Of course, the number of persons in a family is a rather crude indicator of family composition and one could think of including more indícators like the number of children younger than six. To keep the number of parameters to manageable proportions we will stick to this rather simple specification. In any case, we 6 allow the effect of family size to be different for different expenditure categories. As such it is more general than the specification used by Ray (1982) .
The full income shares sm and sf are non-negative and are bounded from above. If both partners decide not to work, sm and sf attain their maximum, respectively wmT~Y and wfT~Y. Of course, a demand for leisure equation is equivalent with a labor supply equation and we shall also refer to (2.2) and (2.3) as labor supply equations.
One of the assumptions underlying the neo-classical model sketched here is that people are free to choose the number of hours they work. Obviously, in practice there may be various institutional constraints on the number of hours one is able to work. A particular feature of the data we use is that it not only contains information on the number of hours household members work, but it also tells us how many hours each household member would like to work at the going wage rate. We refer to the former concept as actual hours and to the latter as preferred hours. We will estimate the model twice, once to explain actual working hours and once to explain preferred working hours. For our empirical analysis we only consider households where both the male and the female partner work in a paid job for at least 15 hours per week.
The 15 hours cut-off point is dictated by the survey design by which certain items of information are not collected for people who work less than 15 hours per week. As a result, we analyse a sample of 139 households for whom a sufficient amount of information has been collected to be able to estimate model 
Estimation Results
The estimation method is outlined in Appendix B. Here we first present the parameter estimates in Table 1 . Next we discuss their economic significance. The a's and Y's are significant at the 5y-level for both specifications, except for Yff in the preferred hours version. The S's are generally insignificant and so are the 6's. One should be careful, however, to base any far-reaching conclusion on the significance or norrsignificance of parameters.
The model is highly non-linear, so that one cannot generally associate a parameter with a particular variable, as in a linear model. A notr-significant coefficient, therefore, does not necessarily point at the possibility that a particular explanatory variable could be discarded without loosing much predictive power. In a non-linear context parameters also determine the curvature of the function and often it is not possible to look at parameters in isolation. For that reason we do not try, generally, to interpret parameters separately but concentrate on the performance of the model as a whole. em-8f-6y-0 a) a0 was fixed a priori for computatíonal reasons ( see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Ray ( 1982)).
b) This statistic follows asymptotically a X2-distribution with threN degrees of freedom. The critical levels for 5Í and 2,5~are 7.81 and 9.35.
In the first place, we notice that the log-likelihoods for the two versions do not differ very much, although it appears that actual hours are explained somewhat better by the model than preferred hours. Since the two versions of the model are non-nested one cannot draw any firm inference from this difference in log-likelihood.
Secondly, although the t-values for the 6-estimates might suggest that family size can be neglected as a determinant of labor supply, a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis 6f -6m -6y -0 rejects this hypothesis at the 5~s ignificance level (cf. the bottom of Tabel 1).
In the third place, the neoclassical model of household utility maximization requires the own welfare compensated (Hicksian) price elasticities to be negative and, more generally, the cost function (see Appendix A) should be concave. One can check per observation point whether these conditions are satisfíed. (See Appendix A for details). It turns out that for preferred hours the own compensated price elasticity is negative for 89~of the observations.
For actual hours the own compensated price effect is negative in 809~of all cases.
The negativity of the own compensated price effect is only a necessary condition for consistency of the observations with utility maximization. When we check the necessary and sufficient concavity conditions, we find that for the preferred hours specification 79I of all households behave consistent with utility maximization, whereas 60y do so for the actual hours specification.
Since any empirical model is bound to suffer from some degree of misspecification, and because there are random factors not captured by the model, [hese numbers are quite encouraging. Also in comparison with other studies these numbers compare favorably. Wales and Woodland (1976) , for example, find rejection of utility maximization for approximately 50Í of their data points.
It is also worth noticing that the preferred hours specification is doing better in this respect than the actual hours specification. Apparently, institutional and other constraints on ntanbers of hours worked forces some households away from a utility maximum. For these households the preferred hours are consistent with utility maximization, but the actual hours are not.
Encourai~ed by these results, we will take utility maximization as our maintained hypothesis and explore some further implication of the empirical results. In Tabel 2 we present for both versions the welfare compensated elasticities of working hours and total consumption with respect to the wage rate and price of consumption.l) All quantities are evaluated at the sample mean. In both specification male and female leisure are complements and both are substitutes for consumption. So, if either the male or the female wage rate goes up, both partners will work less, keeping welfare constant. If the price of total consumption goes up, both partners will respond by working more, once again keeping welfare constant. The results do not seem to differ greatly between both versions of the model.
For comparison, Table 3 presents the uncompensated elasticities evaluated at the sample mean and these tell a slightly different story. 
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The own price effect of male leisure is now positive, indicating that the income effect of a change in the male wage rate dominates the substitution effect. For the rest, the differences between compensated and uncompensated elasticities are small, with the exception of the numbers in the buttom row.
According to Table 3 the income and substitution effects for male and female leisure cancel almost exactly. Consequently, an uncompensated change in the price of consumption would not affect labor supply, but merely reduce consumption proportionately.
It should be borne in mind, however, that these conclusions pertain to the sample mean only. In Figure 1 we present the complete uncompensated labor Finally let us compare the own wage elasticities f ound here with those by Renaud and Siegers (1983a, 1983b) . Since these authors present labor supply elasticities rather than demand for leisure elasticities, we transform our elasticities accordingly and obtain the results of Table 4 . The differences are remarkable. is evaluated. Presumably, our sample mean of wf is relatively high, because we only consider households where both partners work at least 15 hours. Thus the difference between the elasticity estimates may be partly explained by the particular point at which these are evaluated. A correct comparison should take into account the complete labor supply functions.
Policy Simulations
By assuming that household labor supply is consistent with the maximization of a well-behaved utility function, one can investigate both the welfare effects and the behavioral effects of certain policy measures. We shall successively pay attention to a family allowance system and its effect on labor supply and to the effect of rationing of male labor supply on female labor supply and household consumption.
Under the assumption that family composition is exogenous to our Let us take as our reference utility level, the utility of a family of four which is facing wages and unearned income equal to the mean values in our sample. The cost function corresponding to AIDS is given in Appendix A. Using the parameter estimates of the model, we have computed the equivalence scale values for various family sizes. These are given in Tables 5 and 6. 1) This is a rather doubtful assumption (see Siegers, 1980 , Siegers and Zandanel, 1981 , Linssen and Siegers, 1983 . Still, the assumption underlies all of the modern literature on family equivalence scales. We maintain the assumption here, but further research into its validity is definitely needed.
2) The same approach as used here, was employed before by Blundell (1980) in a more elaborate model. Especially for the preferred hours version (Table 5) , the equivalence scale values are surprisinRly close to each other, but also for actual hours the difference in cost of living between a two-person family and one with six children is lower than usually found with alternative methods (e.g. Kapteyn and Van Praag, 1976, Blokland, 1976) . If we accept the model at face value, an interpretation might be that the presence of more children makes leisure more enjoyable. As a result, the cost of reaching a certaín utility level does not increase proportionally with the extra expenditures to be made on behalf of the children.
A more realistic explanation may lie in the sample used for the estimation. The 139 households with two income earners that are used in estimation do not show very much variation in family size.l) This is so because by definition, the households for which the presence of (young) children is an impediment fot female labor force participations are left out. AlthouQh, in principle, our estimation method takes the selective nature of the sample into account, this lack of variatíon in family size is bound to lead to unrealiable estimates of family size effects. And that is probably what Tables 5 and 6 show .
The effects on labor supply are also somewhat erratic. In Table 5 the compensated and uncompensated effects run parallel. If family size increases, the female works less and the male works more. In Table 6 the uncompensated effects run counter to the compensated effects. The uncompensated effects are in the same direction as in Table 5 . But if we compensate for differences in family size, it is the husband who works less when family size increases and the wife who starts working more.
Only by incorporating one earner families into the sample we will be able to obtain more reliable estimates of family composition effects.
Over the last few years there have been various proposals in The Netherlands to reduce unemployment by restricting the number of hours in a full-time job, the idea being that if present employees work fewer hours, employers will hire extra people to make up for the loss of production. It is not our purpose to discuss the merits of this proposal here, but it is of interest to investigate the effects of a rationing of the number of hours supplied by the male partner on the labor supply of the female partner and on ThP rPCnltc in TahlP I CttpP,r'et that a ratlnninp nf malA~.T.,rkino hr`nra will IPaci fhP fPmalP irartnPr tn inrraacP hFr lahnr' cni,Pl~~tr`c"~h an PxrPnt that trtr.al familV c'rtnG,tmirtir,n will almnat rr~main nnrhan,a,Pri, RP~,aneP rhF a,~P raQe valttP rtf tha fPmala wap~ia lnwr~r than thn atrPrapr~mala c~iapA ratP, t'hP i ncrPaGP i n fPma 1 P I ahrtr cn(,(rl v n~~riari t r, kFar rnnc,rtni,t i nn nnrhana~.i i c 1, iohc~r than thP c~crrrPGpr,nriin~r~riitrt tr.n nf malr, wnrlrinF hnnrc.
An annmalV in Tahl~1 wn"lri .nnm tn hr`rhat tha I~1" rati~~nr-~i~-aco fnr rhP at'tnal hrnirG varGinn rnrrac},nnr1G tr, st wr,rlcinp w~Plr whtrh ic crill clichrl;Ĩ nnt;Pr than ChP prafPrrrrl wnrkinp wnnlr withnnr rart~~ninp, WA ha~~~aron~~i in Fiectinn -i, hr,wavar, that thP t,rr~fnrrr~i hn"rc rni,nrtnrl ar~i,r~~hahl.,, "n~lAr PGrtmar.PG, HPnrr' it r1noG nrit malro m"rh~an.r' t,~rnmraro thc rroFnrr~.{ n,m,hnr rtf hrlurG trt tltP arti~.al n~imh~r nf hr"ir..
6. Conclusions
This paper is mainly a methodological exploration of the applicability of AIDS to Dutch individual household survey data on labor supply. The system has proved its flexibility and tests of the household utility maximization hypothesis turn out favorably. The firm rooting in neoclassical demand theory makes the system ideally suited for policy analysis. As two examples, we have dealt with compensations for differences in family size and the possible effects on female labor supply and total household consumption of rationing of male labor supply.
Having established its potential, considerable efforts will have to go into refining and extending the model. These improvements include -Using a larger sample by also including one earner families. This requires the estimation of a wage equation.
-A more sophisticated model for the effects of family composition.
A more appropriate modelling of sample selectivity for the preferred hours version.
If longitudinal data were available, we could add to this list:
Dynamizing the model by incorporating habit formation, so that long run and short run labor supply responses can be disentangled.
Appendix A. AIDS and the Incorporation of Family Size Effects
Consider a household with utility f unction U(ql,...,qn) which maximizes this utility function subject to a budget constraint:
where pi and qi are the price and quantity of the i-th good, i-1,...,n, and Y is income. The result of the utility maximization subject to the budget constraint is a set of demand functions.
Dual to the utility function is the cost function c(u,pl' "''Pn)'
representing the minimum amount of money required to reach utility level u, given prices pl,...,pn. It is well-known that differentiation of the cost function with respect to prices directly gíves the demand functions corresponding to utility maximization. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, b) In this model the effect of family composition can be introduced quite naturally by following an approach due to Barten (1964) . Let the family utility function be redefined in per capita terms: i The last step to be taken is to find a reasonable specification for mi as a function of family composition. We propose the following simple form (A.9) where N is the number of family members. The budget shares sm and sf in (2.2) and (2.3) are bounded from below and from above. The lower bound (i.e. zero leisure, or working 168 hours per week) is never achieved, so we neglect it. The upper bound is achieved whenever a male or female decides not to work in a paid job. In the empirical analysis we only use observations on households where the male works f ull time and the female works at least 15 hours per week (cf. Section 3). In the estimation procedure we have to take this sample selection rule into account.
Since there are not many households where the female partner works more than 15 hours a week and the male does not work full-time, we only take into account the more stringent sample selection rule for female labor supply.
Thus we consider a system of two equations and a sample selection rule accor- There holds 1) The exposition closely resembles the one given by Blundell and Walker (1982) .
2) Because of the restrictions on the elements of Si~
where Si -oif~of' Since a is unknown it has to be estimated. We employ the estimation method developed by Amemiya (1973) .
He observes that We closely follow the expositions in Blundell and Walker (1982) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) . Let male leisure be restricted: k-R. Then m m we want to derive the demand for female leisure, with price wf, and total consumptíon, with price p. The unrestricted cost function is defined as and substituting the solution for u into the compensated demand function (C.6).
Since u can not be solved from (C.7) explicitly, a numerical procedure has to be used.
Note, incidentally, that the cost functions can be used to assess how much extra full income it takes to reach a utility level u in the rationed case, compared to the unrationed case. 
